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This paper proposes a possible way of assessing the effect on interest rate dynamics of 
changes in the decision-making approach, in the communication strategy and in the 
operational framework of a central bank. Through a GARCH specification we show that the 
US and the euro area displayed a limited but significant spillover of volatility from money 
market to longer-term rates. We then checked the stability of this phenomenon in the most 
recent period of improved policy-making and found empirical evidence to show that the 
transmission of overnight volatility along the yield curve had entirely vanished. 
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1 
The perception of central bank actions by the public is as important as the actions 
themselves. Indeed, how the monetary policy decision-making process is understood and the 
way expectations about future moves are formed directly influence the effectiveness of the 
monetary  policy  itself.  Eventually,  the  success  of  current  changes  in  official  rates  in 
affecting spending decisions by households and investment by firms depends almost entirely 
on the impact of such changes on other financial markets’ prices and yields, such as longer-
term  interest  rates,  equity  prices  and  exchange  rates,  which  in  turn  depend  on  the 
expectations about future developments in official rates. 
Central banks, while pursuing their mandate, are always looking for the most effective 
procedures and trying to reduce uncertainty associated with policy decisions. To this end, 
especially since the early 1990s, important changes in the conduct of monetary policy have 
been implemented: (i) an increase in the amount of information regularly released to the 
public; (ii) a move towards gradualism in policy action; (iii) improvements in monetary 
policy operational frameworks and clearer implementation rules.  
Central banks are making an effort to provide all the information about the strategy, 
the final and intermediate targets and the time horizon in an open, clear and timely manner. 
This approach was adopted to influence private sector expectations, and is driven by the idea 
that a broad knowledge of the decision-making process by the public would make the job of 
the monetary policy authority easier (Woodford, 2005). Another way in which the monetary 
authority has tried to influence expectation formation is by establishing certain patterns of 
behaviour  (Bernanke,  2004).  Under  a  gradualist  regime,  the  central  bank  leads  market 
participants  to  anticipate  that  changes  in  the  policy  rate  will  be  followed  by  further 
adjustments  in  the  same  direction.  Finally,  operational  frameworks  have  undergone 
important  changes  to  avoid  an  additional  source  of  noise  in  the  communication  and 
                                                           
1  The authors would like to thank an anonymous referees, Paolo Angelini, Michele Manna, Benjamin Sahel 
and participants to the XV Tor Vergata Conference on Banking and Finance, to the II ICEEE Congress and to 
seminars  held  at  the  European  Central  Bank  and  the  Goethe  University  of  Frankfurt  for  very  helpful 
suggestions and discussions and J. Parkinson for linguistic assistance. The paper does not necessarily reflect the 
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implementation of the monetary policy stance. Since the implementation of monetary policy 
decisions typically takes place through the steering of very short-term interest rates, high 
volatility in money market rates may potentially obscure the signalling power of the policy 
stance. In particular, central banks are concerned about the possible weakening of liquidity 
management  “neutrality”.  A  liquidity  policy  is  “neutral”  whenever  the  monetary  policy 
stance  is  determined  by  the  decisions  taken  by  the  competent  policy-making  body  with 
respect  to  official  rates,  rather  than  influenced  by  the  liquidity  conditions  management 
(Furfine, 2003; Clews, 2005).  
There is a broad agreement that enhanced operational procedures together with better 
communication strategies and increased transparency have improved the predictability of 
central  banks  decisions,  reduced  the  volatility  in  the  money  market  and  enhanced  the 
signalling content of very short-term rates (Hilton, 2005; Issing, 2005). Less firm evidence is 
available concerning the consequences of the increased monetary policy predictability (Stock 
and Watson, 2002; Demiralp and Jordà, 2004; Swanson, 2006). In this paper we focus on a 
specific aspect that, in our opinion, is well suited to the task, even if in an indirect way. To 
gauge the effects of improved monetary policy-making on interest rates, we analyse the 
transmission of volatility along the yield curve. More specifically, we first assess the extent 
to which volatility is transmitted from policy instrument rates to longer maturities. In line 
with the previous literature, we find that some volatility spillover is indeed present, both in 
the US and in the Euro area, over an extended time span. Next, we check whether this 
volatility transmission is stable over time, or whether structural changes can be detected in 
conjunction with episodes of policy reform.  
In principle, the spillover of volatility from the overnight rate to longer maturities may 
be  viewed  as  a  market  flaw.  Higher  volatility  may  translate  into  term  premia,  thereby 
increasing  equilibrium  levels  of  nominal  and  real  long-term  rates  and  disturbing  the 
transmission  mechanism  of  monetary  policy  impulses.  In  this  regard,  the  policy  trends 
mentioned  above  should  have  a  dampening  effect  on  volatility  transmission,  improving 
monetary policy effectiveness. A reduction in the volatility transmission is here used as an 
indicator of the enhanced effectiveness of the monetary policy and thus of the effectiveness 
of the implemented changes. According to this intuition, we find that volatility transmission 
declined to the point that it has completely vanished in recent years. Overall, our findings are     7 
consistent  with  the  idea  that  improvements  in  the  monetary  policy  framework  may  be 
responsible for the changes in the volatility transmission. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides the overnight rate modelling; 
Section 3 documents the volatility transmission along the yield curve; Section 4 assesses the 
evolution of the pass-through mechanism in the most recent period of improved policy-
making; and Section 5 outlines the conclusions. 
2. The overnight market 
Our  empirical  strategy  is  the  following.  In  this  section  and  the  next  we  identify 
satisfactory statistical models for the interest rates at various maturities and we test for the 
presence of volatility transmission from the shortest end of the yield curve (the overnight 
market) to longer maturities. We stop our time horizon just before the financial turmoil 
triggered  by  the  US  subprime  mortgage  crisis  in  the  summer  of  2007.  In  the  following 
section we then assess whether the changes in the monetary policy operational procedures 
and in the way communication with the public is managed may have had an impact on these 
models (i.e., generated some structural instability). 
A first lesson that can be drawn from the empirical literature is that several methods 
are used to measure volatility, each with advantages and shortcomings. However, in recent 
years  the  conditional-volatility  modelling  (ARCH  and  its  variants)  has  quickly  gained 
importance  and  is  nowadays  one  of  the  most  commonly  used  tools  in  applied  financial 
research.
2 Thus, along the line of empirical studies on the same topic, we adopt the following 
GARCH model for the US and the euro area overnight interest rates: 
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2 See Bollerslev (1986) for the seminal contribution. As for the most recent empirical contributions see 
Demiralp et al. (2006), Bali and Wu (2006) for the US, while for the euro area see Perez-Quiros and Rodriguez 
Mendizabal (2006), Nautz and Offermanns (2008). Prati et al. (2003) and Bartolini and Prati (2006) provide 
cross-country  studies  of  the  different  behaviour  of  overnight  markets  in  several  industrialized  economies 
including the US and the euro area.     8 
In  the  mean  equation (1) rt  denotes  the  nominal  overnight  interest  rate, ot  is  the 
official interest rate, DXt is a matrix of calendar dummies. In the variance equation (2) the 
dummy variable St,  which takes the value 1 if εt<0 and 0 otherwise, allows for a different 
reaction of volatility to positive and negative surprises.  
   Table 1: Estimation results for overnight markets 
 
Fed Funds 
   
θ   -0.0030  ***  ν   0.0010  *** 
ρ   -0.7843  **  α    0.4271  *** 
φ1  0.0901  ***  β    0.1953  *** 
φ2  0.0859  ***  γ  0.2204  *** 
φ3  0.1095  ***  ψEM  0.0069  *** 
η0  0.5155  ***  ψEQ  0.1126  *** 
ωEM  0.0876  ***  ψEEEMP  0.0011  *** 
ωBM  0.0369  ***  ψEEMP  0.0033  *** 
ωEQ  0.1352  ***  ψEMP  0.0074  *** 
ωEY  -0.4627  ***       
ωEEEMP  0.0250  ***       
ωEMP  0.0123  **       
ω9/11/2001  -0.7315  ***       
           
EONIA 
           
θ   0.6092  ***  ν   0.0025  *** 
ρ   -0.2771  ***  α    0.2249  *** 
φ1  -0.0343  *  β    0.3154  *** 
η0  0.5002  ***  ψEM  0.0018  *** 
ωEM  0.0406  ***  ψBM  -0.0045  *** 
ωEQ  0.0369  ***  ψEEEMP  0.0019  ** 
ωEMP  -0.0261  ***  ψEEMP  0.0429  *** 
      ψEMP  0.0021  * 
           
NOTE: Daily observations. Sample period: 1.3.1994 - 29.6.2007 for the 
US  and  1.1.1999  -  29.6.2007  for  the  euro  area.  One,  two  and  three 
asterisks  denote  statistical  significance  at  90%,  95%  and  99%, 
respectively. 
 
We modelled the overnight rate in differences, since each rate turned out to be an I(1) 
variable, and introduced as Error Correction Term (ECT) the spread between the overnight 
and the official rate. We also added several dummy variables to take into account calendar 
effects (end of month, quarter and year) and maintenance period effects both in the mean and     9 
variance  equation.  The  conditional  variance  process  together  with  the  conditional  mean 
specification were jointly estimated using the maximum likelihood technique.
3 
Regarding the US overnight market, we use the Federal Funds effective rate (FF) as 
the endogenous variable and the Funds target as the official rate. The latter rate has been 
publicly announced since February 1994, while in the preceding years, the FOMC did not 
formally target the Funds rate. Accordingly, our sample of daily data starts in March 1994 
and ends in June 2007. The development in the Federal Funds effective rate and in the target 
rate are reported in Figure 1 together with the estimated conditional volatility. In the mean 
equation, the impact effect of a 1 percentage point change in the target rate on the overnight 
rate  is  0.52  points  (Table  1).  Thereafter,  the  remaining  differential  between  official  and 
overnight interest rates is removed at the very fast rate of 78 per cent per period (the ECT 
coefficient).  
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3 We tried several specifications to detect the number of lags of both official and overnight rates. In the final 
regression we maintained only variables whose estimated coefficient was significantly different from zero. See 
Table A1 and A2 in the Appendix for the exact data definition and dummy specification.     10 
On the final business day of each month – the high-payment-flow days – we detect an 
increase of both conditional mean and volatility. With reference to the other calendar day 
effects, we find that the parameter on the end-quarter dummy is strongly positive while that 
at year end is significantly negative. In addition, evidence of a positive effect is found on the 
last  days  of  the  maintenance  period.  A  dummy  variable  valued  1  in  the  days  after  the 
terrorist attack of 11 September 2001 takes into account the extraordinary changes in the FF 
rate in those days, while, the coefficient γ turns out to be significant, suggesting evidence of 
asymmetric effects in volatility.
4 The average estimated volatility over the whole period is 
1.7 basis points. 





























As  regards  the  euro  area  overnight  market,  we  rely  on  the  EONIA  rate  (Euro 
OverNight Index Average), while we consider the rate on the MROs (Main Refinancing 
                                                           
4 The diagnostic statistic LM2 did not detect any residual heteroskedasticity up to the fifth order. The 
stability condition of the GARCH model is satisfied (α + β < 1) and the non negativity of the conditional 
variance is ensured by the positive value of ν, α and β.     11 
Operations) as the official rate.
5 Our sample period ranges from January 1999 to June 2007. 
The mean-variance model appears reasonably well-specified: the diagnostic test for ARCH 
effects (LM2) up to the fifth order is easily satisfied and most parameter values turned out to 
be as expected. In the mean model, the impact effect of a change of 1 percentage point in the 
official interest rate is half a point on the overnight rate (Table 1). Thereafter, any remaining 
differential between the official and the overnight interest rate is eradicated at the rate of 28 
per cent per period. Most likely due to window-dressing effects, on the last day of the month 
and of the quarter, the EONIA rate increases by around 4 basis points. As for the variance 
equation, an increase in volatility is detected in the last days of the maintenance period and 
at the end of the month. Figure 2 depicts the development of both the EONIA and the MRO 
rate over time together with the estimated conditional volatility from the system (1)-(2). The 
average estimated volatility is 1.1 basis points, slightly less than that of the US overnight 
market. 
3. Volatility transmission along the yield curve 
The volatility in the overnight market is usually interpreted as “technical” volatility 
mainly due to banks’ liquidity management, i.e. it is not directly related to the monetary 
policy stance of the central bank, thus abrupt changes in that market should be related mainly 
to liquidity shocks. However, the communication policy of the central bank and possible 
changes in the monetary policy strategy may affect market behaviour. Misunderstandings of 
policy intentions and surprises regarding the decisions about the official rates may have 
significant impact on the overnight market. In addition, there is the risk that the volatility in 
the daily money market is unwarrantedly transmitted to longer-term rates, which are relevant 
to real economic decisions such as firms’ investment and households’ consumption. This is 
why, among other reasons, monetary authorities try to stabilize volatility at the very short-
end of the yield curve and to be as transparent as possible in the management of its decision-
making process. 
                                                           
5 For MROs held through variable rate tenders we took the minimum bid rate, i.e. the lower limit at which 
counterparties may submit bids.     12 
In  order  to  assess  the  existence  of  volatility  transmission  across  maturities,  we  
introduce  the  conditional  variance  derived  from  the  overnight  GARCH  model  as  an 
exogenous  variable  in  the  estimates  of  the  volatility  model  at  longer  maturities.  This 
procedure implicitly assumes that overnight volatility is not Granger-caused by longer-term 
interest rate innovations and thus that the transmission may go in one direction only (Ayuso 
et al.; 1997).
6 In addition, the conditional variance is introduced as an explanatory variable 
also  in  the  mean  equation  of  each  maturity  to  check  for  a  possible  direct  effect  of  the 
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where r
i denotes the nominal interest rate with maturity i = 1-month, 3-month, 12-
month, 5-year and 10-year and the suffix on stands for the overnight market. 
 The focus of the exercise is on the coefficient l
i. Positive values of the coefficient 
would  be  consistent  with  the  hypothesis  that  higher  variance  in  the  overnight  market 
translates into higher variance of longer rates. For the FED Funds the coefficient is positive 
and  significant  in  the  variance  equation  of  each  maturity  (Table  2).  As  for  the  other 
coefficients, at longer maturities the level of interest rates are less affected by calendar and 
maintenance period days. The ECT coefficient is significant only for the 1-month maturity, 
in addition it is much smaller than in the overnight model suggesting a significantly slower 
adjustment to official rate changes. There are no volatility transmission effects in the mean 
equation in any of the markets under analysis (k
i is not significantly different from zero), 
implying that the determination of the yields at longer maturities does not depend on the 
(conditional) volatility in the FED Funds rate.  
By looking at the 1-month market we can see that the pass-through is relatively small 
(0.0014). However, the magnitude of the estimated λ
i is not a direct measure of the economic 
                                                           
6In this respect Cassola and Morana (2006) only find limited backward transmission of volatility.     13 
significance of the volatility transmission, since the volatility of the overnight market is 
usually much larger than that of longer rates.
7 
Table 2: Volatility transmission from the Fed Funds rate 
 
  1 month    3 month    12 month    5 year    10 year   
                   
θ      0.0028  **  0.0013    0.0016  **  0.0008    0.0001   
ρ     -0.0247  ***                 
φ1  0.0941  ***  0.1245  ***  0.0329  *  0.0539  ***  0.0519  *** 
φ2  0.7465  **                 
η0  0.0632  ***  0.0951  ***  0.0401  **         
ωEM              -0.0229  ***  -0.0215  *** 
ωEY              0.0310  *  0.0258  * 
ω9/11/2001  0.1926  ***  -0.1114  ***             
k   0.0014    -0.0137    0.0028    -0.0125    0.0007   
ν      0.0010  ***  0.0001  ***  0.0000  **  0.0000    0.0000  * 
α    0.0675  ***  0.0854  ***  0.0502  ***  0.0371  ***  0.0317  *** 
β    0.6053  ***  0.8477  ***  0.9313  ***  0.9500  ***  0.9558  *** 
λ    0.0014  ***  0.0013  ***  0.0005  ***  0.0005  ***  0.0006  *** 
ψEM  0.0024  ***  0.0009  ***  0.0010  ***  0.0011  ***  0.0006  ** 
ψBM  -0.0011  ***                 
ψEQ  -0.0003  ***  -0.0002  ***  -0.0006  **         
ψEY  0.0000  ***                 
                     
ELASTSR  0.0113  ***  0.0064  ***  0.0013  ***  0.0008  ***  0.0009  *** 
ELASTLR  0.0286  ***  0.0786  ***  0.0565  ***  0.0584  ***  0.0760  *** 
                     
NOTE: Daily observations. Sample period: 1.3.1994 - 29.6.2007. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical 
significance at 90%, 95% and 99%, respectively.  
 
In the bottom panel of Table 2 we report two adjusted measures of this pass-through. 







l ,  i.e.  the  impact  elasticity 
computed at the sample average of both volatilities. The second is the average equilibrium 











.  These  elasticities  give  the  percentage 
increase in the variance of rate i due to a 1 per cent increase in the variance of the overnight 
rate, when both variances are at the average level. In particular, the equilibrium elasticity is 
more important for assessing the impact of a permanent shift in the volatility of the FED 
                                                           
7 See Figures 3 and 4 in the next section for a comparison of market volatility levels across maturities. 
     14 
Funds. According to these values, the pass-through rate is around 1.1 per cent for the 1-
month at impact and much smaller at longer maturities. The adjustment in equilibrium is 
somewhat stronger, ranging between 2.8 and 7.8 per cent.  
For  the  euro  area  the  evidence  is  similar  to  that  of  USA:  there  is  a  statistically 
significant transmission of volatility from the EONIA to longer-term rates, with the only 
exception of the 10-year benchmark rate (Table 3), though the volatility pass-through is 
quantitatively limited. The impact elasticity for the 1-month market is just above 1 per cent, 
while that of the other maturities is even smaller. The equilibrium elasticity suggests again a 
stronger impact in the long-run: between 2.4 and 9.7 per cent. The similarity between the 
euro area and the US overnight markets is confirmed by looking at the absolute transmission 
of  the  volatility:  the  pass-through  coefficients  and  the  elasticities  are  of  comparable 
magnitude. 
Table 3 Volatility transmission from the EONIA rate 
 
                     
                     
  1 month    3 month    12 month    5 year    10 year   
                     
                 
θ     -0.0011    0.0013    0.0009  *  0.0003    0.0003   
φ1   0.2335  ***  0.2466  **  0.1118  ***  -0.0106  *  -0.0103  * 
η0   0.1688  ***  0.1396  ***  0.1316  ***  0.0664  **  0.0365  * 
ωEM  0.0012  *                 
κ     0.0125    -0.0277    0.0049    -0.0011    0.0129   
                     
                     
ν     0.0005  ***  0.0003  ***  0.0000  ***  0.0001  *  0.0000  * 
α     0.1003  ***  0.1265  ***  0.0500  ***  0.0434  ***  0.0249  *** 
β     0.5634  ***  0.5692  ***  0.9355  ***  0.9516  ***  0.9671  *** 
λ     0.0012  **  0.0008  ***  0.0007  ***  0.0011  *  0.0005   
ψEM  -0.0011  ***  -0.0006  ***  0.0003  ***  0.0006  ***  0.0004  ** 
ψEY                  0.0003  ** 
ψEMP  -0.0002  **  -0.0005  ***             
                     
                     
ELASTSR  0.0107  **  0.0037  ***  0.0036  ***  0.0022  *  0.0010   
ELASTLR  0.0245  **  0.0284  ***  0.0562  ***  0.0971  *  0.0933   
                     
NOTE: Daily observations. Sample period: 1.1.1999 - 29.6.2007. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical 
significance at 90%, 95% and 99%, respectively.  
 
Summing up, the above evidence suggests that a limited part of the volatility at the 
short-end  of  the  yield  curve  is  transmitted  to  longer  rates.  As  already  mentioned,  the 
volatility in the overnight rate is mostly related to the daily management of banks’ liquidity 
while  longer-term  rates  reflect  broader  expectations  about  future  monetary  policy  and     15 
macroeconomic developments. Thus, at least theoretically, there should not be any volatility 
spillover along the yield curve, especially at the 5- and 10-year horizon. 
Our findings are broadly consistent with the previous (limited) empirical literature. 
Relying on an EGARCH over the period between January 1999 and November 2003, Alonso 
and Blanco (2005) find a significant transmission of the EONIA volatility to the 1-month 
and 3-month rates, but not to the 12-month rate. Over a more recent horizon, Nautz and 
Offermanns (2008) suggest that only the overnight volatility due to non-seasonal effects is 
transmitted along the yield curve. For the US, Abad and Novales (2004) and Lee (2006) hint 
at  a  limited  volatility  transmission  which  is  often  statistically  significant  at  the  usual 
probability levels within the 12-month horizon. 
4. A structural break test 
As mentioned in the Introduction, in the most recent period, since the start of the new 
century, changes in operational procedures, improved transparency, better communication 
and a trend towards gradualism in monetary policy decisions has led to more efficient policy 
making and reduced volatility in money markets. In this section we would like to assess 
whether this widespread improvement in the monetary policy framework has also had an 
impact on the “undesired” transmission of overnight interest rate volatility along the yield 
curve. Table 4 shows the chronology of the most important changes in the conduct and 
communication of monetary policy, which in principle may have had an influence on the 
volatility of the overnight market.
8  
In order to evaluate whether a change in the estimates and patterns documented in 
previous  sections  has  indeed  occurred,  we  followed  the  testing  procedure  described  by 
Andrews (1993) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994). In particular, the procedure is fit to 
                                                           
8 The analysis of the effectiveness of each change in the operational framework or about the innovations in 
policy management goes beyond the scope of this paper. For a survey on the topic and a measurement of the 
improvement in transparency over time due to adjustments in the communication strategy and the operational 
framework of 9 major central banks see Eijffinger and Geraats (2006). See instead Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System (2005) and European Central Bank (2005) for a detailed description of the actual 
operational framework of the two central banks.      16 
detect  a  structural  break  in  the  level  of  the  volatility  when  the  timing  of  the  break  is 
unknown. More precisely, we introduced a dummy B(j) that equals 0 if t ≤ j and 1 otherwise 
in equation (4) and then we tested the null hypothesis that the coefficient of B(j) is 0 over all 
potential break  dates j,  [ ] 2 1,T T jÎ ,  with  [ ] T T 15 . 0 1 = ,  and  [ ] T T 85 . 0 2 =  by  means  of  standard 
LR(j) statistics. Finally, we computed the average LR and the sup LR test statistics. The 
asymptotic  distributions  of  the  tests  are  non  standard  and  depend  on  the  number  of 
coefficients that are allowed to break and on the fraction of the sample that is examined. The 
point at which the LR(j) statistic hits the maximum is an estimate of the break date. 
Table 4: Most significant recent policy-making changes 
Federal Reserve System 
August        1994  Description of the state of the economy and detailed rationale for policy action 
after FOMC decisions 
May            1999  The statement about the economic outlook is released even after no change in 
FFT 
January       2000  Addition of a “balance of risk” to the economic outlook indicating the most 
likely future interest rate action 
March         2002  Release of votes of individual FOMC members 
January       2003  Revision of the discount window lending program 
September  2003  Introduction of an explicit comment  about likely future path of the policy 
November  2006  Reduction  of  operational  complexities  in  the  maintenance  of  the  SOMA 
portfolio 
European Central Bank 
June          2000  MROs conducted as variable rate tenders with minimum bid rate 
November 2001  One meeting for the monetary policy discussions and decisions instead of two 
May          2003   Revision of the monetary policy strategy 
March       2004   Introduction of a new operational framework 
May          2004  ECB  approves  the  gradual  introduction  of  a  “Single  List”  in  the  collateral 
framework  
The recursive test for a structural break in the overnight volatility for both the US and 
the euro area has a hump-shaped plot, suggesting: 1) a strong rejection of the null hypothesis 
of no structural change in the overnight volatility; 2) the existence of a single break over the 
time span under consideration. As regards the time of the structural break, the peak of the 
test is in July 2000 for the US and July 2003 for the euro area. Both dates are close to a 
change in the policy-making framework of the central bank. For the US  the break is not far 
from the introduction by the FED of an explicit “balance of risks” to the economic outlook in 
the post-meeting statement (January 2000), while for the euro area the break is just after the 
monetary policy strategy revision announced in May 2003.  
     17 
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Figures 3 and 4 depict the pattern of volatility in each market for both the economies 
under analysis over the whole horizon, before the break and after the break. It is evident that 
the volatility has significantly decreased in the second half of the sample, especially in the 
overnight markets. Consistently with the findings of Ayuso et al. (1997) for some European 
countries and Alonso and Blanco (2005) for the euro Area, the U-shaped pattern of the 
volatility across maturities up to 12 months is maintained after the break. In addition, the 
curve  is  snake-shaped  overall  due  to  the  reduction  of  volatility  at  the  10-year  horizon 
(Piazzesi, 2005). 
Needless  to  say,  the  aspect  we  would  like  to  assess  is  whether  the  volatility 
transmission from the money market has changed after the break in the overnight volatility 
level. To check for the change, we introduce a duBREAK step-dummy in our regressions and 
consider the conditional overnight volatility derived from the model assuming the structural 
break.
9 Specifically, for all rates we leave equation (3) unchanged and we model volatility as 
follows:  


















, 2 , 2 . 
A significant value of l
i
1 would suggest a change in the volatility spillover across 
markets. In particular, a positive (or negative) value would hint at an increased (or reduced) 
pass-through,  while  the  non-significance  of  the  estimate  would  point  to  an  unchanged 
framework. 
Tables 5 gives the estimation results for both economies and for each market. The 
remarkable result is that the volatility transmission from the overnight market has strongly 
diminished  in  the  second  half  of  the  sample  in  all  markets  for  both  currencies.  The 
coefficient of the multiplicative dummy is always negative and significantly different from 
zero in each specification (including the 10-year euro area bond), while the coefficient l
i
0 is 
                                                           
9 The estimates of equations (1)-(2) for the overnight markets obtained assuming one break (in July 2000 
for the US and in July 2003 for the euro area) are reported in Table A3 in the Appendix. Of course other 
parameters of the GARCH model may have significantly varied after the break, however, given the focus of the 
analysis on the volatility transmission and the simplicity of the model, we allow for the possibility of a change 
in the transmission coefficient only. Nevertheless, we do control for a change in the level of volatility by 
introducing an ad hoc dummy (duBREAK). 
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always significant and usually larger than the corresponding estimate over the overall sample 
(see Table 3), suggesting that indeed in the first part of the sample the transmission was 
stronger. In addition, the Wald test never rejects the null hypothesis that the sum of the 
transmission coefficients is zero thus suggesting that volatility transmission has completely 
vanished in the most recent period. 
Table 5: Structural changes in volatility transmission  
 
Federal Funds 
                     
  1 month    3 month    12 month    5 year    10 year   
                     
ν     0.0010  ***  0.0031  ***  0.0002  ***  0.0005  ***  0.0001  *** 
α    0.0175  ***  0.5585  ***  0.0347  ***  0.0425  ***  0.0310  *** 
β     0.5781  ***  0.4373  ***  0.9214  ***  0.9351  ***  0.9563  *** 
λ0    0.0018  ***  0.0022  **  0.0007  ***  0.0011  ***  0.0007  *** 
λ1   -0.0017  ***  -0.0035  **  -0.0003  **  -0.0007  **  -0.0010  ** 
δ   -0.0002  ***  -0.0002  ***  -0.0001    0.0000    0.0000   
                     
EONIA 
                     
  1 month    3 month    12 month    5 year    10 year   
                     
ν    0.0005  ***  0.0001  ***  0.0000    0.0000  **  0.0000  * 
α    0.1271  **  0.1174  ***  0.0511  ***  0.0421  ***  0.0231  *** 
β    0.4706  ***  0.7202  ***  0.9261  ***  0.9519  ***  0.9670  *** 
λ0    0.0034  ***  0.0020  ***  0.0012  ***  0.0011  **  0.0008  * 
λ1   -0.0032  **  -0.0017  ***  -0.0016  ***  -0.0014  **  -0.0009  * 
δ   -0.0005  **  -0.0001  ***  0.0000    0.0000    0.0000   
                     
Daily observations. Sample period: 1.3.1994 - 29.6.2007 for the USA and 1.1.1999 - 29.6.2007 for the euro 
area. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at 90%, 95% and 99%, respectively. 
 
Of course the underlying causes of the better functioning of the money market cannot 
be determined with certainty since many factors may have concurred in the final outcome 
and the improvement is likely to have been gradual rather then directly linked to a single 
episode.  However,  our  results  are  fully  consistent  with  the  hypothesis  that  an  improved 
general framework of monetary policy decision-making has contributed to the vanishing of 
an undesired volatility spillover across maturities. Table 5 shows that for some markets the 
dummy variable for a break in the level of volatility is non-significantly different from zero 
at  the  usual  confidence  levels,  thus  suggesting  that  the  vanishing  of  the  volatility  pass-
through is independent of a possible reduction of volatility in each market. This in turn 
suggests that it might be a phenomenon attributable to a different source from the “good 
luck” hypothesis or the supposed improved ability of the economic system as a whole to     20 
withstand shocks. What we suggest is that more gradual and transparent behaviour on the 
part of central banks has enabled financial agents to operate in a more efficient way. 
5. Conclusion 
The efficient functioning of the overnight market plays a key role in the financial 
structure of most world economies and in how monetary policy is conducted. On the one 
hand, overnight rates are the anchor for the term structure of interest rates; on the other hand, 
the operating procedures of central banks are designed to affect the supply and demand of 
liquidity reserves between credit institutions. Thus, volatility transmission along the yield 
curve may weaken the signalling power of the monetary policy stance. Also the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy impulses may be hampered by a large volatility spillover 
from overnight to longer-term rates. 
In order to maintain a low level of volatility, central banks have devised various ways 
to influence, directly and indirectly, the liquidity conditions in the overnight market. In the 
last  two  decades,  we  have  witnessed  an  overall  increase  in  the  transparency  of  central 
banking, improved communication strategies and a gradual approach in the decision-making 
process. Further, the operational framework has undergone a series of improvements in order 
to maintain a “neutral” liquidity policy, i.e. the monetary policy stance has to be determined 
only  by  the  decisions  taken  by  the  central  bank  concerning  the  official  rates.  Since  the 
monetary  authority’s  operational  rules  have  a  clear  influence  on  the  functioning  of  the 
overnight market, any change in the framework may affect the dynamics of the short-end of 
the yield curve. Thus, the behavioural features of interbank markets need not be taken as 
given by policy-makers, but can be expected to respond readily and predictably to changes in 
institutional  arrangements  (Prati  et  al.;  2003).  This  in  turn  implies  that  the  analysis  of 
possible structural breaks in the transmission of volatility along the yield curve might be 
used as a good indicator of the consequences of the adopted measures in monetary policy 
management. 
By relying on a common empirical framework for the US and the euro area we showed 
that the conditional overnight volatility is a significant explanatory variable in the volatility 
equation of a GARCH model for the 1-month, 3-month, 12-month, 5-year and 10-year rates     21 
over the period ending in June 2007. Even though the volatility transmission is likely to be 
larger on some particular days of the calendar or in the maintenance period, we found that 
overall the transmission reflected an inadequate understanding of central banks’ decision-
making process or insufficient communication to the financial markets and the public at 
large. In addition, an imperfect design of the operational framework could allow financial 
market  expectations  about  future  policy  decisions  interfere  with  the  standard  overnight 
dynamics. Splitting the sample in order to isolate the most recent period of improved policy-
making,  we  showed  that  the  volatility  pass-through  has  entirely  disappeared  in  both 
economies. Although our exercise is not a direct test of the effectiveness of the changes in 
both monetary policy strategy and the operational framework, our results are consistent with 
the  significant  positive  effects  of  the  move  towards  a  more  open,  efficient  and  gradual 
approach in policy-making devised by the two central banks. 
In our empirical analysis we explicitly took into account the reduction in the volatility 
which occurred across a wide range of financial assets and markets by means of an ad hoc 
dummy variable, however we are aware that other factors other than the improved monetary 
policy framework might be at work. In this regard, a number of empirical and theoretical 
studies  suggests  that  financial  volatility  may  be  counter  cyclical  and  linked  to 
macroeconomic  volatility.  At  least  until  the  summer  of  2007,  the  prolonged  period  of 
“moderation”  in  macroeconomic  developments  may  have  contributed  to  the  subdued 
volatility  in  a  broad  spectrum  of  interest  rates.  In  addition,  improvements  in  financial 
markets (the growth in transaction volumes in the cash market and the rapid spreading of 
credit risk transfer instruments) is another circumstance which is often quoted as a likely 
contributor to the dampening of volatility (BIS, 2006).  
All in all, our results are in line with the current findings of the empirical literature on 
monetary policy conduct. In particular, the improvement in private sector forecasts of short-
term interest rates (Swanson, 2006; Bauer et al., 2006), the reduced macroeconomic and 
financial volatility (Cecchetti et al., 2006; BIS, 2006) and the increased predictability of 
central  bank  decisions  (Bernoth  and  von  Hagen,  2004;  Wilhelmsen  and  Zaghini,  2005; 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007) are all aspects that may be directly or indirectly linked to the 
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EM  End of month 
BM  Beginning of month 
EQ  End of quarter 
EY  End of  year 
EMP  End of maintenance period 
EEMP  One day before the end of the maintenance period 
EEEMP  Two days before the end of the maintenance period 
9/11/2001  Last three days of the maintenance period including 11 September 2001 and the 
first day of the following maintenance period  
      
 
Table A3  
Estimation results for the overnight market with a structural break 
 
Fed Funds 
   
θ   -0.0014  *  ν   0.0080  *** 
ρ   -0.7628  ***  α    0.4025  *** 
φ1  0.0835  ***  β    0.0718  *** 
φ2  0.0672  ***  γ  -0.0459   
φ3  0.0871  ***  ψEM  0.0017  ** 
η0  0.5430  ***  ψEQ  0.1931  *** 
ωEM  0.0679  ***  ψEEEMP  0.0004  ** 
ωBM  0.0228  ***  ψEEMP  0.0020  *** 
ωEQ  0.2381  ***  ψEMP  0.0030  *** 
ωEY  -0.4907  ***  duBREAK  -0.0072  *** 
ωEEEMP  0.0167  ***       
ωEMP  0.0092  **       
ω9/11/2001  -0.6650  ***       
     
     
EONIA 
           
θ   0.2233  **  ν   0.0086  *** 
ρ   -0.2924  ***  α    0.2632  *** 
φ1  -0.0213  *  β    0.4602  *** 
η0  0.5312  ***  ψEM  0.0098  *** 
ωEM  0.0300  ***  ψBM   -0.0124  *** 
ωEQ  0.0347  ***  ψEEEMP  0.0043  *** 
ωEMP  -0.0183  *  ψEEMP  0.0671  ** 
      ψEMP   0.0055  ** 
      duBREAK  -0.0028  *** 
           
NOTE Daily observations. Sample period: 1.3.1994 - 29.6.2007 for 
the US and 1.1.1999 - 29.6.2007 for the euro Area. One, two and three 
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